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The continuous-variable measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (CV-MDI-
QKD) is a promising candidate for the immunity to side-channel attacks, but unfortunately seems
to face the limitation of transmission distance in contrast to discrete-variable (DV) counterpart.
In this paper, we suggest a method of improving the performance of CV-MDI-QKD involving the
achievable secret key rate and transmission distance by using zero-photon catalysis (ZPC), which is
indeed a noiseless attenuation process. The numerical stimulation results show that the transmission
distance of ZPC-based CV-MDI-QKD under the extreme asymmetric case is better than that of the
original protocol. Attractively, in contrast to the previous single-photon subtraction (SPS)-based
CV-MDI-QKD, the proposed scheme enables a higher secret key rate and a longer transmission
distance. In particular, the ZPC-based CV-MDI-QKD can tolerate more imperfections of detectors
than both the original protocol and the SPS-based CV-MDI-QKD.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1–4] is one of the
most mature domains of quantum information process-
ing, aiming to establish a shared key between two dis-
tance honest parties (Alice and Bob) over an insecure
channel controlled by an eavesdropper (Eve), and its
security can be ensured by quantum mechanics. A re-
view of the latest developments in quantum cryptogra-
phy can be found in [5]. In particular, the first theo-
retical Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol [6] was
proposed, so that the discrete-variable (DV) QKD [6–8]
has received increasing attention, and are even available
on the commerce. It can perform outstandingly with re-
spect to the transmission distance, but may suffer from
the restriction of lower secret key rates due to the depen-
dence of the single-photon generation and detection.
In order to overcome this shortcoming, the continuous-
variable (CV) QKD [9–13] has emerged as a new solution
to promise higher secret key rates with the help of the
homodyne or heterodyne detection rather than photon
counters, which make it more attractive from a practi-
cal viewpoint. Especially, the coherent-state Gaussian
modulated CVQKD [9] has been rigorously proved to be
secure against arbitrary collective attacks [14], which are
optimal in the asymptotical limit [15]. Moreover, it has
an advantage of compatibility with traditional telecom-
munication technologies, and thus shows the potential
to be used for the next-generation quantum communica-
tion networks [16]. Unfortunately, when considering the
imperfection of the detector from a realistic scenario, it
opens the door to potential security loopholes that could
be successfully exploited by Eve to execute attack strate-
gies, such as the local oscillator calibration attack [17],
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the wavelength attack [18], and the detector saturation
attack [19]. To resist these attacks, there are usually two
solutions, i.e., the device-independent QKD [20, 21] and
the measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD [22–
27]. Different from the former that based on the violation
of a Bell inequality [20], the latter is a more practical way
to prevent all side-channel attacks on detection where the
security of the protocol does not rely on the reliability of
the measurement devices. Even so, when comparing with
that of DV-MDI-QKD [28, 29], the maximal transmission
distance of CV-MDI-QKD is still unsatisfactory. Thus,
how to effectively improve the maximal transmission dis-
tance in CV-MDI-QKD is an interesting and challenging
task.
Till now, many efforts have been devoted to im-
proving its performance in CV-MDI-QKD systems. In
general, the use of discrete modulations [30] or quan-
tum operations [31–33] is a viable means. For in-
stance, a discrete-modulated CV-MDI-QKD protocol has
been proposed recently, which outperforms the Gaussian-
modulated CV-MDI-QKD protocol with respect to the
achievable maximal transmission distance since such a
discrete modulation has efficient reconciliation error cor-
rection codes in the regime of low signal-to-noise ratio
[30]. However, it has a problem that the modulation
variance should be sufficient low in order to derive the
Eve’s Holevo information, which may cause the trans-
mitting power of the quantum signal to be too low and
hence has much effect on the performance of QKD. In
addition, a novel CV-MDI-QKD protocol using optical
amplifiers has shown that it can achieve a higher se-
cret key rate and a longer transmission distance, com-
pared with previous coherent- and squeezed-states pro-
tocols [31]. Recently, the photon-subtraction operation
[34, 35], which can be emulated by non-Gaussian posts-
election [36], has been proved to lengthen the maximal
transmission distance of CV-MDI-QKD [32, 33]. More
interesting, the single-photon subtraction (SPS) presents
the best performance. In spite of the photon subtraction
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2showing its unique advantages, however, there are still
restricted to the low success probability of implement-
ing such an operation for a given certain variance of the
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) state, thereby resulting
in the loss of information between Alice and Bob during
the distillation of secret keys. Fortunately, the quantum
catalysis operation [37], which can be implemented with
existing technologies, may become an alternative method
of improving the performance of CVQKD systems in
terms of secret key rate and transmission distance, espe-
cially in the case of zero-photon catalysis (ZPC) [38, 39].
Currently, the characteristics of quantum catalysis have
been widely utilized in quantum coherence [40], nonclas-
sicality [41], entanglement property [42, 43], and so on.
As far as we know, there is few applications of quan-
tum catalysis in CV-MDI-QKD. Inspired by the afore-
mentioned analysis, in this paper, we suggest a method
to improve the performance of coherent-state CV-MDI-
QKD by using the ZPC, which has the characteristics of
noiseless attenuation and can keep the Gaussian behavior
of Wigner function. The proposed ZPC-based CV-MDI-
QKD can lengthen the maximal transmission distance
with the achievable high secret key rate. It performs
better than the SPS case with respect to both secret key
rate and transmission distance.
This paper is structured as follows. In Sec. II, we de-
scribes the characteristics of the CV-MDI-QKD protocol
involving the ZPC operation. In Sec.III, we show the
performance of the ZPC-based CV-MDI-QKD system.
The secret key rate of the ZPC-based CV-MDI-QKD is
first derived according to the optimality of Gaussian at-
tack. After that, the simulations and performance anal-
ysis results are provided. Finally, conclusions are drawn
in Sec.IV.
II. THE ZPC-BASED CV-MDI-QKD PROTOCOL
In order to improve the performance of the CVQKD
system, we elaborate the ZPC-based CV-MDI-QKD pro-
tocol with Gaussian-modulated coherent states in Fig. 1.
Among them, Fig. 1(a) shows the prepare-and-measure
(PM) scheme of the ZPC-based CV-MDI-QKD protocol.
It is easy to implement the PM scheme in practice, but
not conducive to security analysis. Consequently, we con-
sider its equivalent entanglement-based (EB) scheme of
the ZPC-based CV-MDI-QKD, as depicted in Fig. 1(b),
where Alice and Bob respectively prepare an entangle-
ment resource, i.e., EPR1 and EPR2 with variances VA
and VB . They retain modes A1 and B1, and send other
modes A2 and B2 to an untrusted third party Char-
lie through the quantum channel with length LAC and
LBC , respectively. To reduce equipment requirements,
we assume that the ZPC operation is controlled by an
untrusted party David, who is close to Alice’s station.
On top of that, Charlie, first interferes with two re-
ceived modes A˜2 and B2 via a 50:50 beam splitter and
obtains two output modes C1 and C2, and then per-
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Schematic diagram of the CV-
MDI-QKD protocol with the ZPC operation (cyan box). (a)
Prepare-and-measure (PM) scheme of the ZPC-based CV-
MDI-QKD. (b) Entanglement-based (EB) scheme of the ZPC-
based CV-MDI-QKD. (c) Equivalent one-way protocol of the
EB scheme of the ZPC-based CV-MDI-QKD under the as-
sumption that Eve is aware of David, Charlie, and Bob’s
EPR2 state and displacement except for heterodyne detection.
EPR1 and EPR2: Alice’s and Bob’s two-mode squeezed state,
respectively. Het: heterodyne detection. Hom: homodyne de-
tection. {XA, PA} and {XB , PB}: Alice’s and Bob’s measure-
ment results of heterodyne detection, respectively. XC1 , PC2 :
measurement results of homodyne detection of measuring the
X and P quadrature, respectively. Π̂off : projection operator
|0〉 〈0|. TA(εA), TB (εB): channel parameters for Alice-Charlie
and Bob-Charlie. Tc(εth): equivalent channel transmittance
(excess noise). D (β): displacement operation of Bob.
forms homodyne detection to obtain a measurement re-
sults {XC1 , PC2}, which are publicly announced through
a classical channel. After receiving {XC1 , PC2}, Bob uses
a displacement operation D (β) with β = g (XC1 + iPC2)
to modify mode B1 to B˜1, where g is a gain factor.
By using heterodyne detection, Alice and Bob respec-
tively measure modes A1 and B˜1 to obtain their own
data {XA, PA} and {XB , PB} of which the data can be
used for implementing parameter estimations. Finally,
a string of secret key can be extracted via data post-
processing.
Due to the assumption that both the EPR2 state and
the displacement operation D (β) are untrusted, the EB
scheme of the ZPC-based CV-MDI-QKD can be equiv-
alent to that of the one-way protocol using heterodyne
detection [12, 24, 32, 33], which is illustrated in Fig. 1(c).
It is worth noting that, different from the equivalent one-
way protocol, the model of CV-MDI-QKD has two lossy
quantum channels. Thus, from the point of view of the
attack strategies, Eve can take two attacks, e.g. one-
mode attack and two-mode attack. However, in a practi-
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FIG. 2. (Color online) (a) Schematic structure of the ZPC
(cyan box) in the PM scheme of CV-MDI-QKD. BS: beam
splitter with a transmittance T . |α〉: coherent state. Π̂off :
projection operator |0〉 〈0|. (b) Wigner function of
∣∣∣√Tα〉
and |α〉 at a given amplitude |α| = 1 as a function of Re (γ)
in the phase space γ ∈ (q, p) with several different values of
T.The highest peaks from right to left correspond to T ∈
{1, 0.9, 0.8, 0.7} , respectively. For convenience, here we take
p = 0, and the black line represents the input coherent state
|α〉.
cal system, adopting a two-mode attack is difficult to be
achieved thanks to the immaturity of quantum memory
technologies. Furthermore, if two lossy quantum chan-
nels are independent, then two-mode attack can be re-
duced to the one-mode attack. As a result, one can take
the security analysis under two Markovian memoryless
Gaussian channels where no entanglement can be dis-
tributed, so that in CV-MDI-QKD, two quantum chan-
nels degenerate into the one-mode channel [44]. In this
situation, the optimal attack strategy for Eve is regarded
as one-mode collective Gaussian attack.
Now, let us turn attention to the relationship of chan-
nel parameters between the ZPC-based CV-MDI-QKD
and its equivalent one-way protocol. In Fig. 1(b), since
the channels of both Alice-Charlie and Bob-Charlie are
both linear, these channels that controlled by Eve can
be emulated by using two independent entangling cloner
attacks where TA = 10
−κLAC/10 (TB = 10−κLBC/10) and
εA (εB) represent the transmittance and excess noise of
the channel between Alice (Bob) and Charlie, κ = 0.2
dB/km. In Fig. 1(c), Tc and εth respectively repre-
sent the transmittance and excess noise of the equiv-
alent one-way protocol, i.e., Tc = g
2TA/2, and εth =(√
2VB − 2/g −
√
TBVB + TB
)2
/TA + TB (χB − 1)TA +
χA + 1, where χj = (1− Tj) /Tj + εj with j ∈ {A,B}.
In order to minimize the equivalent excess noise εth, we
take into account g2 = 2 (VB − 1) / [TB (VB + 1)], and
then have excess noise given by
εth =
TB
TA
(εB − 2) + εA + 2
TA
. (1)
From a practical point of view, we need to consider
Charlie’s inefficient detections, which can be character-
ized by a quantum efficiency η and an electronic noise
vel. Thus, the detection-added noise can be given by
χhom = (vel + 1− η) /η, and the total noise referred to
the channel input is expressed as χtot = χline+2χhom/TA
where χline = (1− Tc) /Tc + εth refers to the channel-
added noise. Note that all the above noises are in the
shot-noise units (SNU).
Before evaluating the performance of the ZPC-based
CV-MDI-QKD system, we suggest the physical charac-
teristics of quantum catalysis. As shown in Fig. 2, the
specific structure of ZPC operation (cyan box) is that a
vacuum state |0〉D in auxiliary mode D is sent to a beam
splitter (BS) with a transmittance T = 1−R, and subse-
quently an on/off detector only registers zero-photon (no
click). Such a catalytic process can, in fact, be taken as
an equivalent operator Oˆ0
Oˆ0 ≡ Tr
[
B (T ) Π̂off
]
=
√
T
a†2a2
, (2)
where B (T ) is the normal ordering form of a BS operator
given by exp[(
√
T−1)(a†2a2+d†d)+(d†a2−da†2)
√
R], and
Π̂off = |0〉D 〈0| is one of the projection operators in the
on/off detector.
After performing by David the ZPC operation for the
incoming EPR1 state in mode A2, where EPR1 on Alice’s
side can be prepared by applying a two-mode squeezed
operator SA1A2 (r) = exp[r(a1a2 − a†1a†2)] with a squeez-
ing parameter r into the two-mode vacuum state, i.e.,
|EPR1〉A1A2 = SA1A2 (r) |00〉A1A2
=
√
1− λ2 exp
(
λa†1a
†
2
)
|00〉A1A2 , (3)
where λ =
√
(VA − 1) / (VA + 1) with VA = cosh 2r. The
resulting state |Φ〉A1A˜2 can be described as
|Φ〉A1A˜2 =
Oˆ0√
Pd
|EPR1〉A1A2
=
√
1− λ2
Pd
exp
(
λ
√
Ta†1a
†
2
)
|00〉A1A˜2 , (4)
with the normalization factor Pd
Pd =
2
1 + T +RVA
, (5)
4
FIG. 3. (Color online) The success probability Pd of the ZPC
operation as a function of T and λ. As a comparison, the
magenta surface represents the SPS case.
representing the success probability of implementing the
ZPC. Based on Eq. (4), the covariance matrix of the
state |Φ〉A1A˜2 can be calculated as
ΓA1A˜2 =
(
xΠ zσz
zσz yΠ
)
, (6)
where Π represents two-dimensional identity matrix,
σz = diag (1,−1), and x, y, z are given by
x = y =
2VA −RVA +R
1 + T +RVA
,
z =
2
√
T (V 2A − 1)
1 + T +RVA
. (7)
As shown in Eq. (2), the ZPC happens to be a noise-
less attenuation described as Oˆ0 |α〉 →
∣∣∣√Tα〉, where
|α〉 is the coherent state in the PM scheme of CV-MDI-
QKD.To this end, we plot the Wigner function between
the input and output states at a fixed amplitude |α| = 1
as a function of Re (γ) in the phase space γ ∈ (q, p) with
several different values of T ∈ {1, 0.9, 0.8, 0.7} , as shown
in Fig. 2b. We can find that the ZPC not only can effec-
tively maintain the Gaussian behavior of Wigner func-
tion, but also does not introduce noises in terms of the
Gaussian distribution between |α〉 and
∣∣∣√Tα〉 . In addi-
tion, unlike the photon-subtraction operation, the ZPC
can facilitate the transformation of the target ensemble
between modes A1 and A˜2 since the auxiliary vacuum
state itself keeps unaffected in mode D. To clearly see
this viewpoint, Fig. 3 illustrates the success probabilities
of both ZPC (blue surfance) and SPS (magenta surface)
with different transmittances T at each λ. We find that
the success probability of implementing the ZPC is al-
ways better than the SPS case and the gap at a given
transmittance T extends with the decrease of λ. This
means that the ZPC has the advantage of the success
probability over the photon-subtraction case, thereby ef-
fectively preventing data loss between Alice and Bob in
the process of extracting the secret key. Moreover, af-
ter the ZPC, interestingly, the resulting state |Φ〉A1A˜2 in
Eq. (4) is still an EPR state with an updated squeezing
parameter λ
√
T .
III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF THE
ZPC-BASED CV-MDI-QKD
So far we have suggested the structure characteristics
of the ZPC-based CV-MDI-QKD system. In what fol-
lows, we calculate the asymptotic secret key rate under
the equivalent one-way CVQKD protocol using hetero-
dyne detection, where Bob performs a reverse reconcilia-
tion. We analyze the security through numerical simula-
tions and demonstrate the performance improvement of
the ZPC-based CV-MDI-QKD system in terms of secret
key rate and transmission distance.
A. Derivation of the secret key rate
It is interesting to note that, after performing the ZPC,
the traveling state |Φ〉A1A˜2 is still a Gaussian state, which
makes it suitable to directly derive the secret key rate
from the conventional Gaussian CVQKD. According to
the optimality of Gaussian attack [45–47], one can cal-
culate the asymptotic secret key rate K by using the
covariance matrix in Eq. (6). Subsequently, the asymp-
totic secret key rate of the equivalent one-way ZPC-based
CVQKD system for reverse reconciliation against one-
mode collective Gaussian attack is given by
K = Pd {βI (A:B)− χ (B:E)} , (8)
where Pd has been defined in Eq. (5), β is the reverse-
reconciliation efficiency, I (A:B) denotes the Shannon
mutual information between Alice and Bob, and χ (B:E)
represents the Holevo bound between Bob and Eve.
As shown in Fig. 1(c), when the state |Φ〉A1A˜2 passes
through an untrusted quantum channel characterized by
Tc and εth, the covariance matrix of the state |Φ〉A1B˜1
can be described as follows
ΓA1B˜1 =
(
XΠ Zσz
Zσz YΠ
)
=
(
xΠ
√
Tczσz√
Tczσz Tc (x+ χtot) Π
)
. (9)
Thus, the Shannon mutual information I (A:B) can be
5calculated as
I (A:B) = log2
VAM
VAM |BM
= log2
(X + 1) (Y + 1)
(X + 1) (Y + 1)− Z2 . (10)
In order to obtain the Holevo bound χ (B:E), we assume
that Eve perceives the existence of the untrusted party
David and purifies the whole system ρA1B˜1ED, so that
χ (B:E) = S (E)− S (E|B)
= S
(
A1B˜1
)
− S
(
A1|B˜mB1
)
,
=
2∑
i=1
G
(
λi − 1
2
)
−G
(
λ3 − 1
2
)
, (11)
with the von Neumann entropy
G (ς) = (ς + 1) log2 (ς + 1)− ς log2 ς, (12)
where S(A1B˜1) is a function of the symplectic eigenvalues
λ1,2 of ΓA1B˜1 given by λ
2
1,2 = (∆±
√
∆2 − 4ξ2)/2, with
∆ = X2+Y 2−2Z2 and ξ = XY−Z2, and Eve’s condition
entropy S(A1|B˜mB1 ) based on Bob’s measurement result
mB , is a function of the symplectic eigenvalues λ3 of
Γ
B
′mB
1
A1
= ΓA1 − σA1B′1(ΓB′1 + Π)−1σTA1B′1 , which is given
by λ3 = X − Z2/(Y + 1).
B. Simulation results and analysis
In the traditional CV-MDI-QKD protocols, the perfor-
mance of the symmetric case (LAC = LBC) is worse than
that of the asymmetric case (LAC 6= LBC) with respect
to the maximal transmission distance. In particular, for
the extreme asymmetric case LBC = 0, the total trans-
mission distance LAB = LAC+LBC can reach the longest
ultimate transmission distance. Based on this circum-
stance, we consider the performance of CV-MDI-QKD
protocol in the extreme asymmetric case involving ZPC
and SPS. To compare with the previous work [32], we
set VA = VB = 40, εA = εB = 0.002 [13] and β = 0.95.
Moreover, taking Charlie’s homodyne detection imper-
fections into account, in the following we consider the
ideal detection (η = 1, vel = 0) and the imperfect detec-
tion (η = 0.975, vel = 0.002), respectively.
For the optimal transmittance T corresponding to Fig.
4(b), Fig. 4(a) shows the secret key rate as a function of
LAB involving the ideal and imperfect detections where
the black dotted line stands for the traditional proto-
col. We find that the ZPC-based CV-MDI-QKD pro-
tocol (blue dashed line), even in the imperfect detec-
tion case, can be superior to the traditional protocol.
Namely, the ZPC can be used not only for increasing the
secret key rate, but also for lengthening the transmission
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FIG. 4. (Color online) (a) The maximal secret key rate of
the ZPC-based CV-MDI-QKD (blue dashed line) versus the
transmission distance under the ideal and imperfect detec-
tions. (b) The optimal transmittance T versus the transmis-
sion distance corresponding to (a). To make comparisons, the
black dotted line stands for the original protocol. The thin
magenta solid line stands for the SPS-based CV-MDI-QKD.
The thick pink solid line stands for the PLOB bound.
distance. Compared with the performance of the origi-
nal protocol, the maximal transmission distance LAB of
the ZPC-based CV-MDI-QKD for a given secret key rate
10−4 bit/pulse can be extended approximately 35.6 km
for the ideal detection (2.95 km for the imperfect detec-
tion). Even if the transmittance T of BS is optimized,
the performance of the proposed protocol is equivalent
to that of the original protocol at the short-transmission
distance. The reason is that there is no quantum cat-
alytic effect when T = 1 of the BS.
Moreover, the tolerable excess noise is another com-
mon criteria for evaluating the performance of CVQKD
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FIG. 5. (Color online) The maximal tolerable excess noise of
the ZPC-based CV-MDI-QKD (blue dashed line) versus the
transmission distance under the ideal and imperfect detec-
tions. As comparisons, the black dotted line stands for the
original protocol. The thin magenta solid line stands for the
SPS-based CV-MDI-QKD.
FIG. 6. (Color online) The secret key rate of the ZPC-based
CV-MDI-QKD protocol (blue surface), the SPS-based CV-
MDI-QKD protocol (magenta surface) and the original pro-
tocol (black surface) as a function of detection efficiency η and
electronic noise vel at a given transmission distance LAB = 20
km.
protocols. In Fig. 5, we illustrate the maximal tolera-
ble excess noise of the ZPC-based CV-MDI-QKD system
as a function of LAB with two cases of the ideal detec-
tion and the imperfect detection, when optimized over
the transmittance T . The numerical simulation results
show that, with the same parameters, the proposed pro-
tocol presents better than other cases in terms of the
maximal tolerable excess noise. The reason is that the
ZPC is indeed regarded as a noiseless attenuation, which
has been proved to increase the maximal tolerable excess
noise [48]. For instance, if ε ∼ 0.001, the proposed proto-
col enables to lengthen the transmission distance up to 90
km for the ideal detection (20 km for the imperfect detec-
tion) between two remote users, which indicates that the
ZPC makes the CV-MDI-QKD protocol more tolerant to
excess noise.
In order to highlight the advantages of quantum cataly-
sis, we show the performance of the SPS-based CV-MDI-
QKD system (thin magenta solid line) with respect to
the secret key rate and tolerable excess noise, shown in
Fig. 4(a) and Fig. 5. We find that the performance
of our protocol with the same parameters surpasses the
SPS-based CV-MDI-QKD case. The reason is that the
success probability of the ZPC is higher than that of
SPS, thereby enabling to avoid the loss of information
during the extraction of the secret key rate by Alice and
Bob. In addition, the physical mechanism of the ZPC is
regarded as a noiseless attenuation, which makes signal
states strongly indistinguishable to Eve and thus reduces
the amount of information stolen. Despite its appealing
merits, the proposed protocol is closer to the Pirandola-
Laurenza-Ottaviani-Banchi (PLOB) bound [49] that rep-
resents the ultimate limit of repeaterless communication
than the SPS-based CV-MDI-QKD.
From the above-mentioned analysis, it shows that not
only are channel imperfections the threat to the security
of CV-MDI-QKD protocols, but also both detection effi-
ciency η and electronic noise vel can affect the informa-
tion on the secret key rate. Therefore, from this practical
viewpoint, Fig. 6 shows the performance comparisons of
the ZPC-based CV-MDI-QKD, the SPS-based CV-MDI-
QKD and the original protocol as a function of η and vel.
It is found that under the framework of a metropolitan
area the performance of CV-MDI-QKD protocol using
the ZPC is superior to the other two cases when both
detection efficiency η and electronic noise vel take a def-
inite value. That is to say, our protocol allows lower de-
tection efficiency and higher electronic noise in the case
of achieving the same performance.
IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, under the extreme asymmetric case, we
have suggested an approach to performance improvement
of the CV-MDI-QKD involving the ZPC that can be
seen as a noiseless attenuation. We derive the secret
key rate of the the ZPC-based CV-MDI-QKD system
in the asymptotic regime. The simulation results show
that the performance of our protocol can outperform that
of the original protocol in terms of the maximal tolera-
ble excess noise and the achievable transmission distance,
which means that exploiting such a ZPC operation can
provide guidance in designing long distance CVQKD sys-
tems. Furthermore, to highlight the advantages of the
ZPC in CV-MDI-QKD, as a comparison, the previous
7SPS-based CV-MDI-QKD is presented. We find that the
proposed protocol is superior to the previous SPS case
with respect to the secret key rate, the transmission dis-
tance and the tolerable excess noise. In particular, from
a practical implementation, adding the ZPC operation
makes the CV-MDI-QKD protocol more tolerant of ho-
modyne detection imperfections under the framework of
a metropolitan area in contrast to the SPS case. Al-
though both of them cannot overcome the PLOB bound
at any transmission distance, this prompts us to find
other approaches (e.g., two-way CVQKD [50]) to break
through the bound.
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